ABSTRACT-Voters in the Associated Press college basketball poll vote own-state teams and teams that are fewer miles away to higher rankings than other teams, especially at the bottom of their ballots. Game outcome data show evidence that teams that are fewer miles away are underrated-not overrated-by pollsters, especially at the top of their rankings, perhaps because pollsters fear accusations of geographic bias. When controlling for distance between pollsters and teams, there is some evidence that pollsters overrate local-conference teams at the top of their ballots, but more properly rate them the bottom of their ballots.
I. Introduction
According to economic theory, discrimination is either taste-based [Becker 1957] or information-based, i.e. statistical [e.g. Aigner and Cain 1977] . Taste-based discrimination occurs when economic agents possess a dislike of certain groups and potentially forgo economic benefits such as profits or wages to avoid them. Information-based discrimination involves economic agents possessing imperfect information about individuals, and therefore assuming they possess the mean characteristics of their group. There may be other forms of discrimination as well. Wolfers [2006] uses the term "mistake-based" discrimination to describe a group being treated differently because its mean characteristics are not correctly known.
1 This paper examines discrimination in the context of college basketball polls with the goal of distinguishing whether discrimination is taste-based or information-based. Using one year's worth of college basketball polls and games, it first determines whether, in a given week, pollsters rank teams differently based on their geographic proximities to teams. Coleman et al [2010] 
used this technique to show that media voters in the 2007 Associated Press College
Football Poll voted teams from their home state and teams from conferences that include ownstate teams to higher rankings than other teams. 2 Fixed effects estimations show that pollsters vote own-state teams and teams that are fewer miles away to better ranks than other teams, especially at the bottom of their polls.
Second, this paper examines whether pollsters rank teams in close geographic proximity more accurately or less accurately than other teams. Assuming that ceteris paribus pollsters should aim to create a poll where better-ranked teams defeat worse-ranked teams, a finding that teams were more likely, for example, to lose when pollsters voted them to higher ranks would indicate that pollsters engage in taste-based discrimination favoring local teams. If instead empirical estimations showed that teams were more likely, for example, to win when own-state pollsters placed them to better ranks, it would suggest that pollsters possessed better information about teams in closer geographic proximity and therefore more accurately ranked them. In such a case, own-state and more-nearby teams voted by pollsters to higher ranks would win more often than other teams of the same rank. Ross, Larson, and Wall [2012] , using a similar methodology but not utilizing data on individual pollsters, find that college football pollsters overrate teams from the Mid-American Conference and underrate teams from the Southeastern Conference and former Pac-10 Conference. Estimations show that pollsters rank own-state teams and teams that are fewer miles away to higher rankings than other teams. The effect is especially strong at the bottom of the polls. Estimations show no evidence that pollsters overrate teams in close geographic proximity. In fact, evidence suggests pollsters more accurately rank own-state teams and may actually underrate teams that are fewer miles away, especially at the top of their polls. There is also some evidence that pollsters overrate teams in local conferences at the top of their polls, but correctly award them better ranks at the bottom of their polls.
This paper adds to the growing literature examining the sources of discrimination. Altonji and Pierret [2001] find that statistical discrimination in labor markets declines over workers' careers because employers become better informed about individual workers' productivity levels. List [2004] shows that discrimination against minority groups (women, racial minorities, and the older-aged) in negotiations over baseball card prices constitutes statistical, not taste-based, discrimination. Levitt [2004] finds that contestants on the television game show The Weakest Link exhibit taste-based discrimination against older contestants and statistical discrimination against Hispanic contestants (the latter by believing they are worse players than white contestants). Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll [2006] find that employment discrimination against black males is reduced when employers can conduct criminal background checks, suggesting such discrimination is statistical. Wolfers and Kumar [2008] discern that male analysts significantly under-predict the performance of firms with female CEOs, suggesting taste-based discrimination. Parsons, Sulaeman, and Hamermesh [2011] find that Major League Baseball umpires call more strikes when the pitcher is of the same race, and believe such discrimination is taste-based because it decreases when umpire monitoring, and therefore the costs of discrimination, rise. Gneezy, List, and Price [2012] show that people are more likely to engage in taste-based discrimination against those who have characteristics-such as obesity and homosexuality-that are believed to be controllable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the dataset and details why this paper examines college basketball instead of college football. Section III empirically determines whether geography affects basketball pollsters' rankings. Section IV determines whether there is a relationship between pollster/team proximity and pollsters' accuracy in ranking. Section V concludes. Bertrand, Chugh, and Mullainathan [2005] as being "unintentional and outside the discriminator's awareness," is a growing field of empirical economic research [Price and Wolfers 2010; Fowder, Kadiyall, and Prince 2012] . Bertrand, Chugh, and Mullainathan [2005] show that implicit biases can have large repercussions.
II. College Basketball Polls
Another reason for using college basketball polls are that college basketball seasons contain more weeks and games than college football seasons, providing more observations for empirical study.
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III. Evidence of Pollster Geographic Bias a. Empirical Strategy
Where i is individual basketball team, p is individual pollster, and t is week of the season, pollster geographic bias is determined through estimations of the equation
B ipt is equal to the number of Borda count points awarded to team i in week t by pollster p. Since B ipt is upper-bounded at 25 and lower-bounded at 0, estimations of Equation (1) CONFERENCE_MATCH becomes insignificant when controlling for distance, indicating that pollsters only vote conference-affiliated teams to higher rankings because they are closer in distance than other teams.
Columns 3-5 repeat Column 2 on subsamples of the data. Column 3 shows coefficients from a fixed-effects logit estimation where the dependent variable is 1 if team i is ranked in poll pt and 0 if not. Teams ranked by every pollster are dropped from the sample, because they are perfectly classified in the logit fixed-effects estimation. All three coefficients are significant,
showing that pollsters are significantly more likely to place own-state teams, conferenceaffiliated teams, and closer teams in their Top 25 than other teams.
Column 4 shows how geography affects the bottom half of pollsters' ballots. The dependent variable, POINTS, is censored at an upper limit of 13 Borda Count points (equivalent to a rank of 13) and a lower limit of 0 (unranked). Teams not ranked between 13 th and 25 th in any week t ballot are removed from the estimations. CONFERENCE_MATCH is insignificant in Column 4, but STATE_MATCH and DIST are significantly positive. In the bottom half of their ballots, pollsters award own-state teams 1.2 more Borda count points and award 1 fewer point for every 1500 additional miles away a team is.
Column 5 shows how geography affects the top half of pollsters' ballots. In this estimation, the dependent variable is censored at an upper limit of 25 (equivalent to a rank of 1) and a lower limit of 12 Borda Count points (equivalent to a rank of 14) instead of 0. Teams that fail to receive 13 or more points in at least one week t ballot are dropped from the estimation. In the top half their ballots, pollsters award a team 2900 miles away approximately 0.5 fewer points than a team 0 miles away. Interestingly, pollsters award conference-affiliated teams 0.12 significantly fewer Borda count points. There is no significant difference in ranking for ownstate teams.
Columns 3-5 indicate that preferences for teams in closer geographic proximity are stronger at the bottom of college basketball polls than at the top. That the preference for proximity is more intense at the bottom of ballots may be because pollsters' discernment of team quality is significantly worse at lower ranks than at higher ranks [Nutting 2011; Stone 2013] , and pollsters may allow their geographic biases to play larger roles when ordinal rankings are less clear. Another factor is that negative repercussions of bias may be lessened at lower ranks.
Pollster John Feinstein, for example, has openly admitted that he reserves the #25 spot for lowprofile local teams when compiling his ballot [Steinberg 2007 ].
The use of Borda count as a dependent variable may be problematic, because its cardinal and spatially autoregressive nature-each pollster is constrained to offering only 325 points total in a given week-results in both direct effects (i.e., ranking team i higher) and indirect effects (i.e., ranking other teams lower because team i is ranked higher) being summed into one coefficient in a Tobit estimation [LeSage and Pace 2009] . This may render the marginal effects in Table 2 biased away from zero, showing more of a relationship between geography and rankings than there actually is. To placate fears that the significance of the coefficients in Table   2 reflect only this endogeneity, I re-estimate Equation (1) using an ordered probit maximum likelihood approach. Ordered probit estimations are less subject to spatial autoregressive bias than Tobits because they treat rankings within a given week as ordinal and not cardinal. Results in Appendix Table 2 show that marginal effects in the ordered probit estimations of Equation (1) are smaller than in the Tobit estimations, as anticipated. Importantly, signs and significances are unchanged, suggesting the significant relationship between geography and ranking uncovered in Table 2 is not solely due to spatial autoregressive bias.
To further investigate the relationship between geography and pollster behavior, Figures 1-4 show nonparametric effects of geography on Borda count points using a Tobit analysis. For each team where STATE_MATCH=1, Equation (1) is used to create a linear predicted value of B.
The positive own-state effect is subtracted, so that That said, the Figure 1 pdfs are skewed to the right, especially in the tails. In the full sample, pollsters are over three times more likely to give own-state teams 2.5-3 more Borda count points than 2.5-3 fewer points. They are over four times more likely to give them 4-4.5 more points than 4-4.5 fewer points. The distribution in the bottom-half sample is similarly skewed.
Importantly, Figure 1 shows that though pollsters vote own-state team to significantly higher ranks (Table 2) , they also frequently vote own-state teams to lower ranks than other pollsters. Pollsters, therefore, do not blindly give extra Borda count points to teams in close geographic proximity, but rather do so selectively. that, even though pollsters vote more-nearby teams to significantly higher ranks, they can and do vote them to lower ranks as well. In Figure 2 , the three pdfs respectively show the full-sample distributions of ipt δˆfor teams that are 0-100 miles from the pollster, 600-700 miles from the pollster, and 1500-1600 miles from the pollster. (These distances are somewhat arbitrary, and respectively reflect nearby teams, average-distance-away teams, and far-away teams.) Figure 2 shows that ipt δˆ is more likely to be between 0 and +1 for teams 0-100 miles away than teams that are farther away. Teams 1500-1600 miles away are more likely to see ipt δˆbe between -1.5
and -1 than closer teams. The tails in Figure 2 are fairly similar for all three groups. Borda Count points than teams 600-700 or 1500-1600 miles away, and teams 1500-1600 miles away are noticeably more likely to end up with ipt δˆbetween -2 and -1.5. Figure 4 shows some evidence that teams 0-100 miles away are more likely to see ipt δˆbetween +0.5 and +1.5 than other teams, and teams 1500-1600 miles away are less likely to see ipt δˆbetween +1 and +2.5 than other teams.
IV. Pollster accuracy and the sources of geographic discrimination a. Estimation strategy
The next estimations examine whether pollsters' accuracy in ranking teams varies with their geographic proximity to teams. Where p is pollster, t is week, g is individual game, and b and w are the better-ranked and worseranked teams in game g, logit estimations take the form example, it presumably has a better chance of winning game g than were it ranked #11.
Similarly, if the worse-ranked team is ranked #4, it presumably has a better chance of winning than were it ranked #16. The RANK controls in Equation (4) are both quadratic in form since poll accuracy is worse at lower ranks [Nutting 2011; Stone 2013] . When the worse-ranked team is unranked, RANK wgpt is represented by a dummy variable. Since geographic biases are manifested via changes in ordinal rank, the RANK controls in Equation (4) may be endogenous.
Therefore estimations of Equation (4) are performed both including and excluding them.
Equation (4) estimations are logits, so e gpt takes a logistic distribution. The game fixed effects η gt present perfect classification problems, because if game gt is correctly (or incorrectly)
predicted by every pollster, its coefficient in η gt is not identified. Thus games that every pollster correctly or incorrectly predicts are dropped from the sample, leaving only games in which there is disagreement among pollsters regarding which of the two teams in game gt is better-ranked.
Standard errors are clustered by pollster. (4), and games omitted from Equation (4) where both teams are ranked are in closer proximity to pollsters' residences, again indicates pollsters' geographic bias. Games omitted from the sample feature better-ranked teams that are much more highly ranked, and are much more likely to feature the better-ranked team winning.
The geography variables are, once again, fairly similar to those of the estimation sample.
b. Coefficients, discrimination, and information
A critical assumption in this section is that pollsters may possess more information about teams in closer proximity, but also possess information about farther-away teams. In other words, pollsters possess an ability, based on previous experience, to discern what qualities make a good team and a bad team. They are able to watch a local team and determine whether it is, for example, a "Top 5 team" or a "Top 15 team," and knowing this they are able to determine whether the rest of the country has the team overrated or underrated. Table 4 shows how coefficients from estimations of Equation (4) can indicate the form of discrimination being observed. Column 1 shows signs that should appear if pollsters have 13 unambiguously better information about local teams. If pollsters possess better information and vote own-state teams more accurately than other teams, they would be correct when they have own-state teams ranked higher, and the coefficient on STATE_MATCH_BETTER would be positive. They would also be correct when they have the own-state team ranked lower, so the coefficient on STATE_MATCH_WORSE would be positive too. The coefficients on the CONFERENCE coefficients would be interpreted analogously and the coefficients on the DIST variables would be reversed, since DIST is inversely related to proximity. If pollsters actually had worse information about teams in close proximity (Column 2), all the signs from Column 1 would be reversed.
If taste-based discrimination caused pollsters to vote own-state teams to higher ranks, own-state teams would lose more often to worse-ranked teams, and the coefficient on STATE_MATCH_BETTER would necessarily be significantly negative (Column 3).
STATE_MATCH_WORSE could be either insignificant or significantly positive. A significantly positive STATE_MATCH_WORSE would, though, (in conjunction with a positive STATE_MATCH_BETTER) provide strong evidence of taste-based discrimination, because pollsters would be less accurate when voting own-state teams to better ranks and more accurate when voting them to worse ranks. This would indicate that voters sacrifice accuracy in order to discriminate. In the event that pollsters actually underrate own-state teams (Column 4), the coefficient on STATE_MATCH_WORSE would be significantly negative, indicating that pollsters are incorrect when voting own-state teams to worse ranks. For both Columns 3 and 4, the CONFERENCE coefficients are once again analogous to the STATE coefficients, and the DIST coefficients are reversed. Table 5 shows results from estimations of Equation (4) when omitting controls for miles of distance between pollsters and teams. (Recall that Table 2 Column 1 showed that own-state and conference-affiliated teams had significantly higher ranks when omitting distance controls.)
c. Baseline results
Column 1 includes games involving unranked teams and omits controls for the ordinal ranks of the two teams. STATE_MATCH_BETTER, CONFERENCE_MATCH_BETTER, STATE_MATCH_WORSE, and CONFERENCE_MATCH_WORSE are all positive but insignificant. Results are barely changed when adding RANK controls (Column 2). 19 When limiting the sample to games in which both teams are ranked in the Top 25 of poll pt (Columns 3-4) all coefficients are again insignificant. Thus there is no evidence in Table 5 that pollsters are more or less accurate when ranking own-state or conference-affiliated teams to higher ranks. Table 7 again uses the full sample as its estimation population, and adds controls for DIST_BETTER and DIST_WORSE to the estimations in Table 5 . In Column 1, STATE_MATCH_BETTER and CONFERENCE_MATCH_BETTER are again insignificant, so there is no evidence that pollsters overrate own-state and conference-affiliated teams.
CONFERENCE_MATCH_WORSE is significantly positive, showing that pollsters are significantly more accurate when they rank conference-affiliated teams to lower rankings. This indicates that pollsters place conference-affiliated teams at lower rankings when they know they are of worse quality. STATE_MATCH_WORSE is similarly positive, but only significant at the 12% level.
DIST_BETTER is significantly negative, showing that when pollsters rank a more-nearby team to a better rank, the more-nearby team is more likely to win. This suggests that pollsters rank more-nearby teams to significantly higher ranks when they know such teams are of high quality. But the significantly positive coefficient on DIST_WORSE indicates that when pollsters rank a more-nearby team to a worse ranking, they are incorrect significantly more often. These interesting results show that even though pollsters award more-nearby teams higher rankings than further-away teams (Table 2) , they may not rank them as highly as they should, and too frequently award them lower ranks. This may occur because pollsters are concerned that, even if they know a more-nearby team to be of high quality, publicly voting them to a high rank may reek of taste-based bias [Morris 2001 ]. Also, if local pollsters possess more information about more-nearby teams, they may overreact to such information [Stone 2013 ] and, for example, punish a local team too severely if it loses or plays poorly in a recent game.
Column 1 results are unchanged when controlling for the ordinal rankings of the two teams (Column 2). Columns 3-4 repeat Columns 1-2 but omit games where the worse-ranked team is unranked in poll pt. Results strengthen, and STATE_MATCH_WORSE becomes significantly positive, showing pollsters are significantly more accurate when voting own-state teams to lower rankings. Table 8 repeats the estimations shown in Table 7 separately for conference games and non-conference games. The coefficients on the distance variables are roughly analogous in sign and significance to their full-sample analogs, though they are much stronger in intensity among conference games. This suggests pollsters are especially and DIST_WORSE are interacted with the ordinal rank of the worse-ranked team. Controls for the ordinal rankings of the two teams are included in all estimations to separately identify the interaction effects from the ceteris paribus effects of pollster accuracy at different ranks. For simplicity, games involving unranked teams are removed from these estimations.
c. Extensions
Column 1 omits DIST controls for the sample. It shows no significant evidence that accuracy involving own-state or conference-affiliated teams varies at different ranks. Column 2 adds the DIST controls and their interaction. DIST_BETTER*BETTER_RANK is significantly positive and DIST_WORSE*WORSE_RANK is significantly negative. Both of these coefficients indicate a weakening relationship between distance and accuracy as pollsters move down their ballots. The relationship discussed earlier-that pollsters are correct when they place morenearby teams to higher rankings, and incorrect when they do the opposite-is strong at the top of pollsters' ballots, but weak at the bottom of ballots. This may indicate that, if pollsters are fearful of being perceived as biased towards teams that are fewer miles away [Morris 2001 ], their fear is most palpable when voting high-ranked and high-profile teams. Thus they underrate more-nearby teams most strongly at the top of the polls.
Column 3 shows results when omitting the STATE_MATCH controls and counting ownstate teams as conference-affiliated teams. CONFERENCE_MATCH_BETTER* BETTER_RANK is significantly positive at the 10% level, 20 while CONFERENCE_MATCH_WORSE*WORSE_RANK is negative, though statistically insignificant. Recall also that in Table 2 pollsters ranked conference-affiliated teams lower at the top of their ballots and higher at the very bottom of their ballots. In tandem, the Table 2 and Table 9 results suggest that pollsters rank conference-affiliated teams (including own-state teams) more accurately at the bottom of their ballots, where these teams are more likely to win when ranked higher. At the top of their ballots, even though they conference-affiliated teams to significantly lower ranks in Table 2 -Columns 2-3 show that they may indeed still be overrated,
i.e. they lose significantly more often when ranked higher and when BETTER_RANK is smaller.
Since some researchers have expressed concerns about interaction terms in logit models [Ai and Norton 2003] , Columns 4-6 reproduce Columns 1-3 using a fixed effects linear probability model instead of a fixed effects logit model. Coefficients on interactions terms have the same signs, though significance weakens. CONFERENCE_INTERACT and DIST_INTERACT are defined analogously. The bottom of each column shows the sum of the three STATE coefficients and the sum of the three CONFERENCE coefficients, and the respective p-values of chi-square tests of significance.
These show whether pollsters more correctly order own-state or conference-affiliated teams than other teams. Since the DIST variables are not dummies, results from two separate tests are shown: one examines how pollster accuracy changes when the teams move from 750 miles closer than their respective mean values (shown in Table 3 ) to their mean values, and the other shows accuracy when they move from their respective mean values to 750 miles further away.
When including games involving unranked teams in the sample and omitting RANK controls (Column 1), there is no evidence that pollsters more accurately order teams in closer geographic proximity. Adding RANK controls (Column 2) changes virtually nothing. Columns 3-4 repeat Columns 1-2 but omit unranked teams. In Column 3, the STATE coefficients sum to 1.162, and the sum is significantly positive at the 13% level, providing some weak evidence that pollsters are more likely to correctly order own-state teams when both are ranked. The sum of the CONFERENCE coefficients only has a p-value of 0.261. When moving from 750 miles closer than the mean to the mean, pollster accuracy improves, and the effect is significant at the 14% level. This weakly suggests that pollsters order more-nearby teams less accurately than other teams, ceteris paribus, perhaps because they underrate them too frequently. Results including RANK controls (Column 4) are very similar. 21 Columns 5-8 repeat Columns 1-4 but perform linear probability models instead of logit estimations. Results are, again, similar but weaker. Coefficients in linear probability estimations can be interpreted as marginal effects.
V. Conclusion
This paper uses poll data and game outcome data from the 2009-2010 college basketball season to determine whether AP Poll voters exhibit geographical discrimination in their rankings, and to further discern whether such discrimination constitutes taste-based or information-based discrimination. Results show that pollsters vote more-nearby teams (which are fewer miles away) to significantly higher rankings, especially at the bottom of their polls. In the bottom half of polls, own-state teams are ranked to higher ranks, but at the top of polls conference-affiliated teams are actually voted to lower ranks. More-nearby teams, own-state teams, and conference-affiliated teams are more frequently ranked in the Top 25 than other teams.
Estimations on game-outcome data show no evidence that pollsters overrate, i.e. engage in taste-based discrimination favoring, teams in close geographic proximity. When pollsters place an own-state or conference-affiliated team to a higher ranking, there is no significant loss in accuracy, and when they place a more-nearby team to a higher ranking, they increase their accuracy. When pollsters vote own-state teams and conference-affiliated teams to worse rankings, they improve their accuracy, correctly inferring that these teams are of worse quality.
But when they vote more-nearby teams to worse rankings, they reduce their accuracy. This last result suggests voters underrate more-nearby teams, perhaps because they are hesitant to be perceived as engaging in taste-based discrimination. The effect is especially strong at the top of polls. Other estimations provide some weak evidence that pollsters are more likely to correctly order own-state teams than out-of-state teams, but also that they order more-nearby teams less accurately that teams that are the mean distance away.
The research in this paper could be extended in several directions. The relationship between geography and pollster behavior could be studied in a more dynamic framework.
Pollster responses to performance-such as wins, losses, margin of victory, etc.-could be examined to see if nearby pollsters react differently than farther-away pollsters. Furthermore, the relationship between pollsters and fans could be measured to see if pollsters are influenced by customer discrimination [Holzer and Ihlanfeldt 1998; Burdekin et al 2005] . With polls and pollster contact information being publicly available, and with more media members having websites, blogs, or twitter accounts where vocal fans often post comments, 22 pollsters may feel pressure to vote local teams to higher ranks. Perhaps an interesting future topic of research could entail whether pollsters who have more interaction with fans have higher rates of taste-based geographic discrimination. -likelihood -89,523.9 -89,491.3 -13,937.4 -56,390.8 -35,854.7 Rankings in Estimation 1-13 13-25 1-25 1-25 Table 7 Estimations of Equation (4) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Robust standard errors in brackets 
